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Admissibility of DNA Genetic Profiling Evidence in
Criminal Proceedings: The Case for Caution
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its debut in a Florida courtroom in 1987,1 DNA "fingerprint-
ing" 2 evidence has captured the attention of prosecutors, defense at-
torneys and the popular press. 3 As the newest method of
establishing identity, DNA profiling has been widely touted as "the
most powerful, most accurate piece of forensic evidence that's ever
been created."4
DNA profiling was developed by molecular biologists for use in the
genetic research of inherited diseases.5 DNA testing has since been
heralded as the answer to legal quandaries ranging from murder to
paternity.6 Using minute traces of genetic material extracted from
seemingly harmless sources such as a single strand of hair, a speck of
dried blood, a drop of saliva, or a semen stain on a bedsheet,7 DNA
1. Andrews. .State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). Andrews was the
first person in the Uhited States "to be convicted of a crime with the help of DNA
evidence." Lewis, DNA Fingerprints: Witness for the Prosecution, DISCOVER, June
1988, at 44, 52.
2. While DNA testing is often referred to as DNA "fingerprinting," this term is
disfavored because of its tendency to "create unsubstantiated beliefs and expectations
in the minds of judges and jurors." Burk, DNA Fingerprinting: Possibilities and Pit-
falls of a New Technique, 28 JuIuMETRics J. 455, 468-69 (1988). Therefore, this Com-
ment will refer to this technique as either DNA "profiling," "analysis," or "testing."
3. See, e.g., Moss, DNA-The New Fingerprints, A.B.A. J., May 1, 1988, at 66 (not-
ing that DNA profiling "could revolutionize law enforcement"); Lewis, supra note 1, at
52 (DNA typing is the greatest boon to forensic biology since fingerprinting).
4. Williams, Conviction By Chromosome, STUDENT LAW. Dec. 1989, at 26, 29.
5. See White, Lalouel, Lathrop, Leppert, Nakamura & O'Connell, Mapping Ap-
proaches to Gene Identification in Humans, 147 W.J. MED. 423, 423 (Oct. 1987) (noting
the use of DNA testing to diagnose a predisposition toward inheritable genetic diseases
such as sickle-cell anemia, Huntington's Disease, and muscular dystrophy).
6. Burk, supra note 2, at 455. DNA testing is used in establishing parentage. By
comparing the DNA prints of the child and the alleged parents, experts "can establish
family blood lines with unprecedented precision." Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing:
Promising Forensic Technique Needs Additional Validation, TRIAL, Sept. 1988, at 56.
While the admissibility of DNA testing in civil actions such as paternity cases is also
not fully resolved, this Comment confines its examination to the admissibility of DNA
testing in criminal cases, where the need for reliability and precision of scientific
methods is greatest.
7. Moss, supra note 3, at 66. Urine samples cannot be utilized in the DNA
screening process because urine does not contain DNA. Comment, DNA Identification
Tests and the Courts, 63 WASH. L. REv. 903, 909 n.27 (1988).
testing attempts to identify criminals by "matching" the suspect's
own DNA with samples acquired at the crime scene.8
Although DNA profiling technology is still in its forensic infancy,
the technique has permeated the legal system with amazing speed, 9
leaving defense attorneys reeling in its wake.o Oddly enough, the
seemingly resigned complacency of defense attorneys confronted
with DNA evidence has fueled DNA's meteoric transition from the
scientific laboratory to the court of law." Thus, DNA testing exper-
ienced a relatively tranquil initiation into the legal system. However,
defense attorneys and various segments of the scientific community
have recently awakened to potential problems with the reliability of
DNA evidence. DNA, like several innovative evidentiary techniques
before it, has finally come under attack.12 The question now seems
to be whether DNA has earned its place in court because of its accu-
racy and reliability as a tool of identification, or whether judges, ju-
ries, and defense attorneys, like laypersons, have been dizzied by the
whirlwind of scientific terminology and overzealous claims of the me-
dia and the commercial laboratories which perform DNA testing.' 3
This Comment will assess the present status of DNA testing, focus-
ing particularly on the legal questions stemming from the technique's
strengths and limitations when put to forensic applications. Part II
provides a basic explanation of DNA and the scientific principles un-
derlying DNA profiling. This background is essential in order to
competently evaluate the reliability and admissibility of DNA test re-
sults. Part II also profiles the two distinct methods of DNA typing
currently offered by commercial laboratories in the United States.
Part III presents a discussion of the two principle legal standards for
8. Moss, supra note 3, at 66. DNA profiling offers several advantages over tradi-
tional methods of examining biological specimens. For example, DNA profiling is
more precise and reliable than blood group typing and can be performed on samples of
a much smaller size. Thompson & Ford, supra note 6, at 56. See also, Moss, supra note
3, at 66-67 (outlining advantages of DNA profiling).
9. Between 1987 and 1989, DNA profiling evidence was utilized in approximately
eighty cases throughout the nation. Williams, supra note 4, at 26.
10. Houston defense attorney Moses Sanchez, after losing a criminal case in which
DNA evidence was introduced, stated:
It's devastating. When an expert comes in and says there's a one in 700 mil-
lion chance that your man is not the one--and you know he's one of only 30
million black men in the country-it just kills you. It intimidates the jury.
The defense bar better get ready.
Taylor, From One Speck, a Case is Made, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 16, 1989, at 3, 22.
11. In each of the first three appellate criminal cases in which DNA evidence was
admitted by the court, defense attorneys failed to call any expert witnesses to chal-
lenge the introduction of the DNA test results. See infra notes 174, 195, 206 and ac-
companying text.
12. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (inadmissibility of the lie
detector test); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (inadmissibility
of voiceprints).
13. Williams, supra note 4, at 26.
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the admissibility of novel scientific evidence and the problems associ-
ated with each. Part IV analyzes the admissibility of DNA evidence
within the framework of each admissibility standard, and concludes
that the present state of DNA technology has not yet achieved the
level of reliability required by either standard. Part V examines the
four criminal decisions14 involving DNA evidence which have
reached the state appellate level thus far. Finally, Part VI delves be-
yond the parameters of admissibility, focusing on potential abuses as-
sociated with DNA profiling. In particular, this Comment will
address the constitutional issue of the fourth amendment protection
against illegal search and seizure as it applies to the taking of genetic
samples. Additionally, in light of DNA's unequalled ability to reveal
personal information unrelated to identity, the possibility of a nation-
wide DNA data bank will be explored in terms of constitutional pro-
tections of individual privacy.
II. SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND
A. A Simplistic Explanation of DNA
The human body is composed of individual units called cells. In
turn, each cell contains 46 chromosomes arranged in 23 sets of two.
One chromosome per pair is inherited from each parent.15 It is these
chromosomal capsules which hold the genetic information known as
deoxyribonucleic acid, commonly referred to as DNA.16
The DNA molecule x7 is arranged in a double helix configuration.
The rungs of this "twisted ladder" consist of genetic building blocks
called bases.1s There are four types of bases, known by the designa-
tions "A," "T," "C," and "G." These bases join in pairs in a system-
14. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Spencer v. Com-
monwealth, 238 Va. 563, 385 S.E.2d 850 (1989); Cobey v. Maryland, 80 Md. App. 31, 559
A.2d 391 (1989); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989).
15. Kelly, Rankin & Wink, Method and Applications of DNA Fingerprinting: A
Guide for the Non-Scientist, 1987 CRIM. L. REV. 105, 106 [hereinafter Kelly]. During
meiosis, the process of egg or sperm formation, portions of the chromosomes are rear-
ranged. Thus, a child will possess traits which are recognizably similar, but not identi-
cal, to his parents. Id. at 108.
16. Id. at 105-06. See also, Burk, supra note 2, at 456.
17. Contrary to common belief, all molecules are not miniscule. When stretched
to its full length, the DNA molecule measures over six feet in length. Note, The Dark
Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant,
42 STAN. L. REV. 465, 469 (1990).
18. Burk, supra note 2, at 457. Each DNA molecule contains approximately three
billion base pairs. White & Lalouel, Chromosome Mapping with DNA Markers, Sci.
AM., Feb. 1988, at 40.
atic fashion: "A" always joins with "T," and "C" always joins with
"G."19 One author likens the structure of DNA to a "zipper" having
bases for teeth.20 This zipper of coded information will only zip up
with a strand of DNA having a corresponding sequence of bases
along the chain. Once the DNA strand is zipped, each sequence of
bases along the chain of the DNA molecule is "read" by the cell and
translated into a physical characteristic. Thus, all the components of
a person's appearance which make him unique-for example, height,
build, hair and eye color-are predetermined by DNA.21 Each per-
son's molecular pattern of DNA is itself unique.22 It is this factor of
undisputed distinctiveness which is the basis of all forms of DNA
testing.
B. The Goal of DNA Profiling
DNA profiling operates under a very simple premise: No two indi-
viduals have identical ordering of DNA base sequences; therefore,
two samples which match must necessarily have come from the same
person. Inherent in this theory is the assumption that, if there are
differences in two DNA samples, the laboratory technician will be
able to detect them. This is not an easy task. Because all human be-
ings belong to the same species, they are much more anatomically
similar than different.23 Consequently, the vast majority of DNA
base pair sequences do not vary from person to person.24
However, DNA profiling is possible due to the recent discovery of
techniques which allow scientists to locate regions of DNA where
dramatic variations between individuals do occur. These areas of va-
riation are known as polymorphisms.25
19. Kelly, supra note 15, at 106; Burk, supra note 2, at 457. While the bases always
join with a corresponding mate, each person's DNA has an individualized order of base
pairs. Comment, supra note 7, at 910. "A," 'T," "C," and "G" stand for adenine,
thymine, cytosine, and guanine, respectively.
20. Kelly, supra note 15, at 106.
21. Comment, supra note 7, at 909. DNA is often referred to as a genetic
blueprint because it possesses all the information necessary to assemble the entire
human body. Thompson & Ford, supra note 6, at 58. However, each cell reads only
the portion of the blueprint which pertains to its specific function. Burk, supra note 2,
at 457.
22. Kelly, supra note 15, at 108. Identical twins, however, have identical DNA
characteristics. Thompson & Ford, supra note 6, at 58; Hill & Jeffrey, Use of Mini-
satellite Probes for Determination of Twin Zygosity at Birth, LANCET, Dec. 21-28, 1985,
at 1394.
23. Thompson & Ford, supra note 6, at 58. For example, all human beings nor-
mally have two arms, two legs, and one head. These common features are the result of
similar sequences of DNA shared by all individuals. Lewis, supra note 1, at 47.
24. Thompson & Ford, supra note 6, at 58.
25. Id. The first polymorphic site was discovered by A. Wyman and R. White.
Comment, supra note 7, at 911 n.34. Since this breakthrough, scientists have identified
more than three thousand polymorphic regions. Lander, DNA Fingerprinting on
Trial, 339 NATURE 501, 501 (1989).
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C. Overview of Current DNA Profiling Techniques
Polymorphic DNA segments can be detected and analyzed in two
ways. Of the three commercial laboratories26 in the United States
which perform DNA profiling tests, Cellmark Diagnostics27 and
Lifecodes 28 employ the first method, known as "restriction fragment
length polymorphism (RFLP) analysis." 29 The remaining laboratory,
Cetus,30 examines polymorphic segments via an alternative method
called "allele specific probe analysis." 31 Because RFLP and allele
specific probe analysis differ greatly in both theory and procedure, a
brief explanation of each technique is warranted.
1. RFLP Analysis
This approach involves breaking the chain of DNA into small seg-
ments, locating the polymorphic sites,3 2 and then measuring the
length of these polymorphic fragments.33 Polymorphic fragments
vary dramatically in length among different individuals, offering a
promising method of identification.3 4
This process is accomplished in seven basic steps.3 5 First, a rela-
tively pure38 sample of DNA is extracted from forensic evidence. 37
26. Cellmark Diagnostics, Lifecodes Corporation, and Cetus Corporation. Moss,
supra note 3, at 66-67. A fourth DNA typing laboratory was opened by the FBI in Jan-
uary, 1989. Its services are available free of charge to any law enforcement agency na-
tionwide. During its first year of existence, the FBI lab received over seven hundred
requests for DNA profiling. Williams, supra note 4, at 31.
27. Cellmark Diagnostics, based in Germantown, Maryland, was the first Ameri-
can laboratory to introduce the technique developed by British geneticist Alec Jef-
freys. Thompson & Ford, infra note 29, at 56.
28. Lifecodes Corporation is based in Elmsford, New York. Id.
29. Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic
Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45, 64 (1984).
30. Id. Cetus Corporation is based in Emeryville, California. Thompson & Ford,
supra note 6, at 56.
31. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 64.
32. This is accomplished through the use of genetic probes. Genetic probes are
small pieces of DNA selected specifically because they possess base sequences comple-
mentary to the sequence which the scientist desires to lock onto. Thompson & Ford,
upra note 29, at 63 n.83 and accompanying text.
33. Thompson & Ford, supra note 6, at 58. See also Thompson & Ford, supra note
29, at 63-64.
34. Id
35. See Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 64-76 (outlining seven scientific proce-
dures undertaken in RFLP analysis).
36. The biological material is chemically and enzymatically treated in order to re-
lease the DNA. Then the DNA is treated with enzymes and organic solvents in order
to purify it. Id. at 65. In cases of rape involving more than one perpetrator, DNA pro-
filing results are often inconclusive due to the commingling of seminal fluid from dif-
Next, the DNA is cut into segments with a mixture of restriction en-
zymes.38 Some, but not most, of the resulting fragments contain
polymorphic DNA segments.39
The third step consists of a sorting process known as gel electro-
phoresis.40 The DNA restriction fragments are placed in agarose gel,
a substance which closely resembles Jell-O.41 An electrical current is
then sent through the gel, causing the fragments to move toward the
opposite end of the tray.42 The longer DNA fragments move more
slowly through the gel than the shorter DNA fragments.43 Thus,
when the electric current is removed, the DNA fragments will have
moved different distances and will be dispersed across the gel in cor-
relation to their length.44
The fourth step in RFLP analysis is called Southern Blotting.48
The array of DNA fragments is transferred from the gel slab onto a
thin nylon membrane. This transfer creates a blot.48
The fifth step in RFLP analysis is known as hybridization.47 In hy-
bridization, a radioactive genetic probe is introduced to the collection
of fragments. The probe sorts out the polymorphic segments of
DNA-those that will differentiate among individuals-from the mil-
lions of other segments. The genetic probe locks onto the
polymorphic fragments and excludes all others.48 The probe's radio-
ferent sources. However, the combination of seminal and vaginal secretions poses no
such problem. See Burk, supra note 2, at 464.
37. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 65. There are two problems associated
with DNA extraction: insufficient quality of DNA and contaminated DNA. Id. at 65-
67. See also supra note 7 and accompanying text (forensic evidence amenable to DNA
typing).
38. These restriction enzymes, "biological scissors," seek out particular base se-
quences, typically four to twelve base pairs in length, and sever the pairs from the re-
mainder of the DNA strand. The severance locations are called restriction fragments.
Comment, supra note 7, at 912 n.42.
39. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 69.
40. Id.
41. Burk, supra note 2, at 459.
42. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 69. The electrical current causes DNA, a
negatively charged molecule, to migrate toward the positive pole at the end of the tray.
Id. at 69 & n.114; Burk, supra note 2, at 459.
43. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 69. This concept is easily visualized if one
thinks of people running through a dense forest carrying batons of varying lengths.
Persons carrying the longer batons will naturally have more difficulty navigating
through the trees and, therefore, will move more slowly than those carrying the
shorter batons. Burk, supra note 2, at 459-60.
44. Thompson & Ford, supra note 6, at 59.
45. This technique is named for its creator, biologist E.M. Southern. See White &
Lalouel, Ctromosome Mapping with DNA Markers, Sci. AM., Feb. 1988, at 40.
46. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 71. The purpose of this transfer is simply
to avoid the inconvenience of manipulating the DNA while it is in the "messy" gel.
Burk, supra note 2, at 460.
47. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 71.
48. Id. This process is like passing a large magnet over a haystack in order to lo-
cate several needles within the mountain of hay. Id.
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activity ensures that the researcher can locate the position of the
fragments on the blot.49
Lifecodes' "DNA-Print" test utilizes a single-locus probe. In crimi-
nal cases, Celimark utilizes this same technique.50 The single-locus
probe is designed to bond with DNA sequences that occur only once
on the DNA strand. This technique normally results in a DNA print
consisting of two bands.5 1
Once the radioactive probe has bound itself to the polymorphic seg-
ments, the sixth step in RFLP analysis is undertaken. In this step,
called autoradiography, the blot is put on x-ray film.52 A pattern of
dark bands will appear on the x-ray film, marking the locations of
the radioactive probes, and thus, the location of the polymorphic seg-
ments of DNA.53
Finally, the DNA print is interpreted. This is accomplished by
comparing the pattern of bands from the crime scene specimen with
the sample taken from the criminal suspect or victim. The matching
of the samples can be performed visually by human technicians or by
computer.54
2. Allele Specific Probe Analysis
The process utilized by Cetus Corporation is much simpler than
RFLP, but not necessarily as useful in criminal cases. Instead of
measuring the length of polymorphic segments, this test uses probes
to determine whether segments, known as alleles, are present in a
DNA sample.55
Using extreme heat and cold, the number of alleles in a DNA sam-
ple is amplified, creating millions of alleles where only one may have
49. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 71-72.
50. Id. at 72. Cellmark utilizes a multilocus probe in paternity cases. The mul-
tilocus probe seeks out and bonds with DNA sequences in more than one polymorphic
locus which results in approximately fifteen interpretable bands. Id. This Cellmark
test is much more specific, but harder to interpret, than the single-locus probe tech-
nique. Id.
51. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 72. This is because chromosomes come in
pairs; one inherited from each parent. However, if both parents have the same blood
type, only one band will be produced on the Lifecodes DNA print. Id at 72 & n.125
52. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 74.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Thompson & Ford, supra note 6, at 62. "If the length polymorphism approach
is like using a magnet to find a needle in a haystack, allele specific probes are like us-
ing a metal detector to see if a particular type of needle is present or not." Id.
been present before.56 Next, a probe is added to the sample. If the
desired allele is present, the probe will attach itself to it. Finally, the
sample is placed on x-ray film, where a dot will appear if the probe
has connected with the allele being sought. Thus, the Cetus process
gives a simple yes or no answer.57 This is somewhat of a drawback,
however, for a significant portion of the population may possess the
same allele.58 Thus, a series of probes is necessary in order to distin-
guish between individuals with any degree of certainty.
Having reviewed the technology involved, the legal aspects which
bear on the admissibility of DNA profiling will now be considered.
III. THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR ADMITFING DNA TYPING EVIDENCE
Before admitting novel scientific evidence,59 a court must'screen
the underlying technique to ensure the reliability of its results. The
legal admissibility of DNA typing evidence can be determined only
after deciding what legal standard should govern. Traditionally,
courts have relied on one of two alternative tests in evaluating the
reliability of novel scientific evidence. The majority6 0 of jurisdictions
still utilize the test set forth in Frye v. United States6 l (the Frye
.test). An increasing minority6 2 of states, however, employ the more
liberal standard of the Federal Rules of Evidence (the Federal Rules
test).63
A. The Frye Test
In 1923, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals considered the admissi-
bility of systolic blood pressure evidence 64 in a case of first impres-
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. As much as 10% of the population may possess any given allele. Note,
supra note 17, at 475 n.50.
59. Novel scientific evidence refers to scientific procedures and related opinion ev-
idence which have not gained acceptance by the courts. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE § 702[03], at 702-34, 702-35 (1987 & Supp. 1988).
60. Approximately two-thirds of the jurisdictions employ the Frye test. Williams,
supra note 4, at 26. "Frye is the leading American authority on the admissibility of
scientific evidence. Until very recently, Frye was the almost universal view among
American courts." Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence-
A Primer on Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV.
261, 264 (1981) (footnote omitted).
61. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
62. Approximately one-third of all jurisdictions now employ the Federal Rules
standard. Williams, supra note 4, at 26.
63. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 403, 701, 702, 703.
64. The systolic blood pressure test, predecessor to the polygraph, measured
changes in blood pressure thought to occur when the subject told a lie. Note, The Ad-
missibility of Electrophoretic Methods of Genetic Marker Bloodstain Typing Under the
Frye Standard, 11 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 773, 779 n.35 (1986).
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sion.65 In an eight-paragraph opinion which cited no authority for its
conclusion, the court precluded the introduction of the evidence and
announced the following standard as the threshold for admissibility:
Evidence derived from innovative scientific techniques will be admis-
sible only after the theory has gained general acceptance within the
relevant scientific field.66 The foundational premise of the Frye rule
is that "general acceptance" is indicative of reliability.67 "Once a pro-
cedure is sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs, it presumably has gone
through an extended period of use and testing within the scientific
community and is reliable."68
1. Justifications for the Frye Test
Beyond the assurance of reliability, several other justifications for
the Frye test exist. Supporters stress that the concepts underlying
novel scientific evidence are often beyond a lay person's ability to un-
derstand and critically evaluate. The Frye standard attempts to cor-
rect this weakness by placing the determination of reliability in the
hands of experts familiar with the theory. "In effect, a technical jury
passes judgment on the probative value of the evidence before it is
presented to a lay jury, which might be unduly swayed by the per-
ceived infallibility of 'science.' "69 In this way, the Frye test relieves
the court of the burden of establishing per se reliability. Instead, the
judge need only satisfy himself that experts in the relevant field con-
sider the technique reliable.70
65. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
66. Id. at 1014. In a frequently quoted passage, the court stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the ex-
perimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the de-
duction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id.
67. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 53.
68. Jonakait, Will Blood Tell? Genetic Markers in Criminal Cases, 31 EMORY L.J.
833, 849 (1982).
69. Comment, supra note 7, at 933. See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741,
743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (scientists are better equipped than courts or lay juries to assess
reliability); People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148
(1976) (scientific community which developed the novel evidentiary technique should
determine its reliability).
70. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 54 (noting that judges can more easily as-
sess the opinion of experts than the reliability of the technique itself).
Another justification for the Frye test is its assurance that at least
a minimum number of experts are able to review the reliability of
the innovative evidence. This forecloses the possibility that litigants
will be unable to challenge the evidence due to an inability to locate
knowledgeable experts.71 Defenders of the Frye test also emphasize
that the standard eliminates the need to re-examine a novel tech-
nique's admissibility in subsequent cases once the issue has been de-
cided.72 Finally, the Frye standard promotes uniformity in
decisions.73
2. Criticism of the Frye Test
While the majority of courts have embraced the Frye test, the stan-
dard has been the target of several "scathing" attacks.74 Some crit-
ics find fault with the premise of the test. One court derided the
Frye standard, stating that "[a] determination of reliability cannot
rest solely on a process of 'counting [scientific] noses.' "75 Other com-
mentators point to difficulties in applying the test, characterizing it
as vague and ambiguous. 76 Much of the alleged ambiguity is caused
by the Frye court's failure to quantify the standard by which a scien-
tific technique may be considered "generally accepted."77 Courts
have also encountered difficulty in identifying the "relevant field" of
science to which the technique belongs and from which the elusive
71. Id. (citing United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
72. Note, supra note 64, at 779. See also Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 388, 391 A.2d
364, 371 (1978) ("Without the Frye test or something similar, the reliability of an ex-
perimental scientific technique is likely to become a central issue in each trial in which
it is introduced, as long as there remains serious disagreement in the scientific commu-
nity over its reliability.").
73. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244-45, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148-
49 (1976). The court stated that: "Individual judges whose particular conclusions may
differ regarding the reliability of particular scientific evidence, may discover substan-
tial agreement and consensus in the scientific community." Id. at 31, 549 P.2d at 1245,
130 Cal. Rptr. at 149. See also, Reed, 283 Md. at 387-88, 391 A.2d at 370-71 (pointing out
that decisional inconsistency is avoided).
74. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1206 (1980) (citing Moenssens,
Polygraph Test Results Meet Standards for Admissibility as Evidence, in LEGAL AD-
MISSIBILrrY OF THE POLYGRAPH 14, 19 (N. Ansley ed. 1975) ("archaic"); Conrad,
Landmarks and Hallmarks in Scientific Evidence, in SOURCEBOOK IN CRIMINALISTICS
37, 38 (C. Hormachea ed. 1974) ("antiquated on the day of its pronouncement")).
75. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) ("In testing for
admissibility of a particular type of scientific evidence, whatever the scientific 'voting'
pattern may be, the courts cannot in any event surrender to scientists the responsibil-
ity for determining the reliability of that evidence.").
76. See Giannelli, supra note 74, at 1223. See also Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198 (not-
ing that "[dlifficulty in applying the 'Frye test' has led a number of courts to its im-
plicit modification").
77. See Giannelli, supra note 74, at 1205, 1210-11. See also Note, supra note 64, at
780.
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"general acceptance" of experts must be drawn.78
However, the most compelling argument against Frye is that it re-
quires the exclusion of valuable scientific evidence until such time as
it attains widespread acceptance.7 9 This delay between development
in the laboratory and introduction to the courtroom is viewed by
some as a frustration of the search for truth and justice.8 0 These crit-
icisms have led some jurisdictions to abandon the Frye test in favor
of more liberalized standards of admissibility which focus on the
weight of the evidence rather than its reputation in the scientific
community.8 1
B. The Federal Rules Test
The principal alternative to the Frye test is the relevancy standard
contained within the Federal Rules of Evidence.82 Under the Federal
Rules test, novel scientific evidence is treated in the same manner as
other evidence. The fact that the evidence is derived from an innova-
tive technique is not necessarily a bar to admissibility.83 Under the
relevancy approach, the validity of novel scientific evidence is ana-
78. See Gianelli, supra note 74, at 1208-10. One author stated:
"Deciding what is the proper field to which a novel test belongs is in itself a
chore. Most novel tests represent new approaches to the solution of old
problems by a process which is unknown, or belongs to a different field. Be-
cause of this, the person developing a novel test frequently finds himself on
the fringes of his scientific discipline, and perhaps overlapping into other
disciplines."
Moenssens, supra note 74, at 17.
79. See Giannelli, supra note 74, at 1223-24; Imwinkelried, supra note 63, at 265.
"During the 1970's, Frye proved to be a formidable barrier to the introduction of prose-
cution scientific evidence.... Defense counsel invoked Frye so successfully that the
commentators almost unanimously deplored the fact that Frye banned many promis-
ing forensic techniques from the courtroom." Imwinkelried, supra note 63, at 263.
80. Id. at 265 & n.39 (citing United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44, 53 (E.D. Pa.
1974) (refusing to apply Frye test in probation revocation case)).
81. See Giannelli, supra note 74, at 1228-31 (current acceptance of the Frye test).
82. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 202, 203 (2d ed. 1972). See also 3 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 702[03] (1980) (advocating a balancing approach
weighing probative value of novel scientific evidence against other factors such as the
necessity of the evidence and the possibility of utilizing limiting instructions).
83. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID.
401.
Under Rule 402, "all relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided
by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evi-
dence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. EVID. 402.
lyzed in terms of its probative value.8 4 Expert testimony regarding
novel scientific evidence is generally admissible if it is helpful to the
trier of fact and probative of a material issue.8 5 However, this evi-
dence will be excluded if the probative value of the evidence "is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."8 6
1. Probative Value
The threshold of admissibility under the Federal Rules test is a
demonstration that the proffered evidence has some degree of proba-
tive value. In order to be probative, evidence must be relevant.8 7
Relevance, in turn, necessarily depends upon reliability.88 Because
most judges are unable to evaluate the reliability of a scientific tech-
nique based on either prior experience or logical inference, the court
is usually forced to rely on the opinions of scientific experts.8 9
While general acceptance of the technique by experts in the rele-
vant field (the Frye standard) would fulfill the requirement of relia-
bility and, hence, probative value, no such "general acceptance" is
required under the Federal Rules.90 In fact, the opinion of one quali-
fied expert may be enough to establish probative value under the
Federal Rules test.91 Thus, in comparison to Frye, the Federal Rules
provide a more lenient standard, favoring the admissibility of
evidence.9 2
2. Dangers of Unfair Prejudice
While a particular piece of evidence may be probative, it is not nec-
essarily admissible. The Federal Rules grant the court discretion to
exclude evidence upon finding that the danger of admitting the evi-
dence substantially outweighs its probative value.93 The principal
84. Giannelli, supra note 74, at 1235.
85. See FED R. Evim. 702 (testimony by experts).
86. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice).
87. FED. R. EVID. 401. See also Giannelli, supra note 74, at 1247 n.379. ("Under
the relevancy approach, the validity of a novel technique is analyzed in terms of its
probative value. If a technique is not valid or reliable, results derived from that tech-
nique are not conisidered probative.").
88. See United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 94-95 (E.D. Mich. 1972) ("accept-
ance of the basic theory is part of the process of making the evidence relevant"); State
v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978) ("voiceprint" analysis held sufficiently reliable to
be relevant).
89. Giannelli, supra note 74, at 1235-36.
90. See also Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence,
1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 22. ("in the case of scientific evidence the court will generally be
forced to accept the probative value of the evidence as what a qualified expert testifies
it to be") (emphasis in original).
91. Giannelli, supra note 74, at 1236.
92. See Comment, supra note 7, at 935-38.
93. FED. R. EvID. 403. The rule states that: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prej-
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danger associated with the introduction of novel scientific evidence is
its tendency to mislead the jury. In spite of this latitude, courts tend
to apply the test liberally and admit most evidence.94
IV. APPLICATION OF THE LEGAL STANDARDS TO DNA PROFILING
A. Admissibility of DNA Profiling Under the Frye Test
In assessing the admissibility of DNA profiling under the Frye
standard, uncertainties abound. Uncertainties, not only as to the end
result, but also as to the standard itself. Indeed, where a court ends
up is largely determined by its choice of a starting point.9 5 The first
step which a court must take in applying the Frye test to DNA evi-
dence is to determine the relevant field in which DNA profiling
belongs.9 6
Like many other scientific techniques, DNA profiling is not easily
compartmentalized within the exclusive domain of a single profession
or scientific field.97 The areas of molecular biology, genetics, popula-
tion genetics, chemistry, biology, and biochemistry have been sug-
gested as suitable choices for DNA profiling.98  While these
categories seem appropriate at first glance, there are problems associ-
ated with each of them.
By selecting fields such as biology and chemistry, the judiciary
would be drawing an arena which is too broad, encompassing a ma-
jority of scientists who have little or no practical experience with
DNA profiling techniques. If this were in fact the relevant field,
DNA profiling would not be able to garner the general acceptance
necessary under Frye because the majority of these scientists have no
connection with DNA testing.
However, narrowing the field to those scientists who perform DNA
testing is likewise an untenable position. Such a category is still too
udice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id
94. Comment, supra note 7, at 935-36. See also United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d
463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975) ("it is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same
manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-exami-
nation and refutation"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
95. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding that
"[s]election of the 'relevant scientific community,' appears to influence the result"),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
96. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 55-56.
97. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
98. See People v. Wesley, 140 Misc. 2d 306, 332, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 659 (Albany
County Ct. 1988).
broad, for it primarily embraces molecular biologists and geneticists
who have employed the technique only in the research laboratory, a
setting fundamentally unlike a forensics crime lab where accurate re-
sults are crucial. Indeed, scientific researchers are exceedingly toler-
ant of error, secure in the knowledge that unanticipated results will
be verified through a highly repetitive research process.99 Moreover,
most scientific research will, in all likelihood, be duplicated by other
researchers working independently on the same project.' ° ° Thus,
any error in theory or technique utilized by the researcher will usu-
ally be brought to light.
Forensic laboratories, by contrast, lack such safeguards. Errors in
DNA testing could quite easily go undetected if the results are not
diametrically opposed to the prosecutor's theory. The suspects to
whom other evidence points the finger of guilt, and thus the individu-
als most in need of accurate testing results, would therefore be at
great risk of injustice.' 0
Therefore, due to the medical researcher's high threshold for er-
ror, perhaps their general acceptance also should not be the standard
by which to gauge the admissibility of DNA analysis in criminal
cases. It has been suggested that a better choice for the "relevant
field" would be scientists who are experienced in making critical de-
cisions based on the results of a single DNA test: medical diagnosti-
cians, for example.10 2
However, problems exist with this selection as well. While scien-
tists involved in medical diagnosis may be experienced in DNA typ-
ing, their experience consists exclusively of performing DNA analysis
on clean, fresh genetic samples.10 3 Unfortunately, the samples
presented to crime labs are usually less pristine. In fact, contami-
nated specimens are the rule rather than the exception in the crime
lab.104 For example, DNA samples derived from crime scenes may
be subject to bacterial contamination, 10 5 physiological alteration,9 9
99. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 56.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 57.
102. Id. at 56-57.
103. Id. at 56. See also id. at 66-67 (examining reliability of DNA typing on contam-
inated samples).
104. Id. at 56. In discussing his experience with DNA samples in both research and
forensic laboratories, one scientist explained that, in a research laboratory, sterility of
the sample is a paramount concern. Accordingly, if a sample accidentally falls on the
floor, it typically is not used. However, "in forensics, all of the samples have been on
the floor, so you don't really know what you've got." Cooke, Standards Sought for
DNA Testing, NEWSDAY, June 15, 1989, at 27.
105. Bacterial contamination can cause erroneous hybridization of the DNA mole-
cule, resulting in the appearance of false and misleading bands on the ie-ray which, if
gone undetected, could result in "false positive" findings. See Comment, supra note 7,
at 921.
106. The chemicals contained in many detergents have been shown to produce
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and degradation due to time lapse or exposure to the elements.107
Thus, DNA profiling is destined to fail the Frye standard unless
the relevant field is narrowed further and defined as those forensic
scientists acquainted with the analysis of DNA samples for forensic
uses. Since forensic DNA analysis is a recent scientific development,
the number of such experts is, as would be expected, quite limited.
In fact, apart from a sparse grouping of scientists within subdivisions
of environmental biology, physical anthropology, and evolutionary bi-
ology, the only scientists with relevant experience in testing "dirty"
samples are those employed by the commercial laboratories which
market their techniques to law enforcement agencies nationwide.O8
Therein lies a further problem.
The Frye standard necessarily contemplated that the experts
whose acceptance is determinative of admissibility would be impar-
tial.109 However, most cases involving DNA evidence to date have
suffered a distinct lack of impartial expert witnesses.110 In fact, de-
fense attorneys have lost several battles against the admissibility of
DNA largely because of their inability to locate expert witnesses
other than those associated with the commercial laboratories. Faced
with favorable testimony from the prosecution's witnesses and with
no witnesses testifying for the defense at all, there is a danger that
aberrations in DNA, causing inaccurate test results. DNA samples utilized for forensic
purposes are especially prone to contamination from detergents because such samples
are frequently culled from clothing or carpets which have been previously cleaned
with detergents. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 66.
107. Id. at 65-66. While DNA has been extracted from a 2400 year old Egyptian
mummy, see Paabo, Molecular Cloning of Ancient Egyptian Mummy DNA, 314 NA-
TURE 644 (1985), in reality, such DNA samples are too degraded to be useful in DNA
profiling. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 66 n.93.
108. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 56. Experts familiar with contaminated
genetic specimens are scattered throughout various academic disciplines. However,
their shared experience constitutes the only common denominator among them. Id. at
56 n.65.
109. General acceptance is not achieved by the expert opinion of one individual, es-
pecially if that expert is not impartial. See, e.g., People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141, 146,
257 N.W.2d 537, 539 (1977) (admission of voiceprint evidence held reversible error since
expert witnesses were not "disinterested and impartial"). But cf United States v.
Wright, 17 C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967) (testimony of the developer of voiceprint
technology stating in essence that the method was virtually infallible was admitted by
the court).
110. For instance, Dr. Michael Baird, manager of forensic testing for the Lifecodes
Corporation and Dr. Alec Jeffreys, developer of the technique used by Cellmark, have
been called upon extensively to testify for the prosecution in several Frye hearings.
Baird's testimony was a cornerstone of the prosecution's case in People v. Castro, 144
Misc. 2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). See also infra notes 181-85 and
accompanying text.
some courts may mistakenly conclude that the "general acceptance"
standard of Frye has been met on this basis alone."' 1
Granted, prosecutors have also called upon the testimony of biolo-
gists and geneticists unassociated with commercial laboratories.
However, because these scientists are unfamiliar with the testing of
contaminated DNA specimens, they do not constitute members of the
"relevant field" and their general acceptance is irrelevant under
Frye. Thus, at this stage, the only relevant testimony comes from bi-
ased experts who "naturally paint a rosy picture of the test and its
accuracy."11 2
Unless this "bias factor" is treated by the judiciary as merely an is-
sue of weight rather than admissibility, the number of qualified ex-
perts within the relevant field will be severely limited. This being
the case, the widespread consensus of experts envisioned by Frye will
become illusory, replaced by the opinions of a few unbiased experts,
assuming any can be found.113
At present, there is no suitable relevant field from which to garner
general acceptance. Given this gaping hole in the case for admitting
DNA evidence, the judiciary should hesitate before admitting DNA
evidence under Frye.
Should a court be successful in delineating a relevant field suitable
for application of the. Frye test, the next step would be to evaluate
whether the scientists working in that field have generally accepted
DNA profiling analysis as reliable.114 Before this can be accom-
plished, however, the court must decide another threshold question:
namely, what must be accepted.1l 5
There is an ongoing debate as to whether the Frye standard man-
dates a finding of general acceptance of the scientific technique, the
theory underlying the technique, or both.116 The D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals has interpreted Frye as requiring acceptance of the the-
ory.11 7 Other courts, however, refer exclusively to acceptance of the
111. See infra notes 167-238 and accompanying text for a discussion of appellate
court decisions to date.
112. See Burk, supra note 2, at 468. Currently, the corporations marketing DNA
profiling are earning $40 million per year. Unger, Court ChalLenge Casts Pall over
DNA Testing Industry, NEWSDAY, July 30, 1989 (Business), at 47.
113. Giannelli, supra note 74, at 1209-10.
114., Id. at 1210-11.
115. Id. at 1211.
116. Id.
117. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The court stated: "The
Frye standard ... requires that the '[theory] from which the deduction is made be suf-
ficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs.'" Id. at 743 (brackets in original) (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013, 1014 (1923)). See also United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163 n.3 (8th Cir.
1975) (requiring "general acceptance in the relevant scientific community of the theory
underlying such technique").
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technique.1lS
By focusing on one aspect to the exclusion of the other, courts are
able to manipulate the Frye standard to fit their desired conclusion.
The reliability of the theory behind DNA analysis is not disputed.
DNA analysis has proven itself reliable in the realm of genetic re-
search.1' 9 By defining the Frye standard as requiring general accept-
ance of only the theory underlying DNA profiling, the courts are
able to ignore the shortcomings of the various techniques when ap-
plied to contaminated samples in a forensic lab. The Castro 120 court
broke ground by recognizing the need to ensure the reliability of
both the theory and the technique.121 To do otherwise would emas-
culate the Frye standard, stripping it of the ability to screen out relia-
ble theories that fall apart under realistic testing conditions.
Finally, having decided what must be accepted and by whom, the
court must then endeavor to assess whether DNA profiling evidence
has, in fact, achieved general acceptance in the relevant field.122
While it seems evident that both the theory and the techniques em-
ployed in DNA profiling must be examined, the present commercial-
ized nature of DNA testing makes it difficult, if not impossible, to
evaluate the techniques employed to derive a criminal identification.
Both Lifecodes and Cellmark, as business entities competing for
shares in an extremely lucrative field, keep their laboratory tech-
niques confidential in order to safeguard their respective trade
secrets. 12 3 By asserting their proprietary rights, the commercial labo-
ratories are able to shield their techniques from the scientific com-
munity at large.124 In fact, in some of the DNA Frye hearings to
date, the only scientists who have reviewed the testing procedures
used by the commercial laboratories were hand-picked by the labora-
tories themselves. Furthermore, defense attorneys have been sys-
tematically denied access to the laboratory notes and other internal
documentation concerning the procedures employed.125
118. Giannelli, supra note 74, at 1211-12 (citing People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 69,
84, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708, 718 (1974); United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 385, 391 A.2d 365,
370 (1978)).
119. See Kelly, supra note 15, at 110.
120. People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
121. For a general discussion of the Castro opinion, see infra notes 223-38 and ac-
companying text.
122. Giannelli, supra note 74, at 1215.
123. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 59.
124. Id. at 59-60.
125. See Cooper, DNA Case Is First Before a State High Court, 11 NAT'L L.J., July
Because of their self-imposed vow of silence, the commercial labo-
ratories have placed themselves in a contradictory situation. The lab-
oratories send their experts to Frye hearings to attest to their
technique's general acceptance among the scientific community. At
the same time, however, the laboratories assert their right to confi-
dentiality, and thus shield themselves from the critical eye of scien-
tists unassociated with the corporations.126
This "two-faced" approach to admissibility may pose less of a prob-
lem in the future due to the recent emergence of studies conducted
by independent researchers with the consent of the commercial labo-
ratories.127 However, until such time as these independent studies
become widespread, the commercial laboratories' assertion of propri-
etary rights will adversely impact the likelihood that DNA profiling
has been generally accepted. Currently, general scientific acceptance
cannot occur given the atmosphere of secrecy which shrouds DNA
profiling technology from public view.
B. Admissibility of DNA Profiling under the Federal Rules
Although the Federal Rules test does not require general accept-
ance of the evidence, and therefore constitutes a more liberal stan-
dard of admissibility than the Frye test, DNA profiling fails to meet
this basic standard of admissibility as well. When closely examined,
the probative value of DNA profiling evidence is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice which may result from its
admissibility.
1. Probative Value
Under the Federal Rules test, probative value is necessarily a func-
tion of reliability. 128 Thus, while the Federal Rules test abandons the
general acceptance standard of Frye, the court must still inquire as to
the reliability of the novel scientific technique. The primary author-
ity on the reliability of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules
test is United States v. Williams.129 In deciding whether to admit
voiceprint technology into evidence, the court focused on five indicia
of reliability: (1) the potential for error associated with the new tech-
3, 1989, at 14, col. 3 (discussing Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 563, 385 S.E.2d 850
(1989), in which trial court denied defense attorney access to information regarding
Lifecodes' technique). For a general discussion of the Spencer opinion, see infra notes
187-98 and accompanying text.
126. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 60.
127. One such study conducted by the California Association of Crime Lab Direc-
tors questioned the reliability of the Cellmark technique. Daily J., Feb. 28, 1990, at 1,
col. 4. The study concluded that Cellmark declared erroneous matches in 2% of the
blind samples. Id.
128. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
129. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978).
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nology; (2) the presence and observation of testing standards; (3) the
degree of care in which the test has been performed and the test's
susceptibility to abuse; (4) whether the technique bears an analogous
relationship to other scientific techniques which have been deemed
admissible; and (5) the existence of "fail-safe" characteristics.130 If
the Williams definition of reliability is valid, DNA profiling fails the
Federal Rules test for admissibility. Accordingly, each of these fac-
tors will be addressed.
To begin with, the rate of error associated with DNA profiling has
not been determined; however, given two factors, it is presumably
quite high. First, DNA prints are often "ambiguous or difficult to in-
terpret."'3' Although DNA prints are often likened to the computer
barcodes utilized by supermarkets, the comparison is strained. In re-
ality, the bars on DNA prints are much less well-defined than prod-
uct codes, and "look a lot more like fuzzy caterpillars." 3 2 Moreover,
two DNA profiles from the same person may look slightly different
from each other. Likewise, two DNA profiles from separate individu-
als may look surprisingly similar. 33
Thus, the profiling expert is placed in a difficult position. In set-
ting the threshold for declaring a match, he must allow himself suffi-
ciently wide "latitude of acceptance" in order to compensate for
minor variations between prints of the same person, while at the
same time guard against the danger of mistakenly declaring a
match.' 34 At present, there are no uniform guidelines regarding
matching standards.135 Therefore, the fate of criminal suspects may
hinge on the subjective interpretation of a single lab technician. 3 6
The other factor which indicates that DNA profiling is subject to a
high rate of error is its reliance on statistical predictors. Scientists
must rely on statistical probabilities in declaring matches because
DNA tests compare only small segments of DNA.137 It is crucial to
bear in mind that no person's DNA is unique at any particular loca-
130. Id. at 1198-99.
131. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 80.
132. See Sherman, DNA Tests Unravel?, 12 NAT'L L.J., Dec. 18, 1989, at 1, 24, col. 4.
133. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 87-88. Minor variations in DNA prints
are commonly referred to as "slop." Id. at 87.
134. Id, at 87-88.
135. Id. at 88; Sherman, supra note 132, at 24, col. 4 ("Different labs use different
matching rules .... And there is no scientific consensus yet on what is appropriate.").
136. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 88; Sherman, supra note 132, at 24, col. 4.
137. Sherman, supra note 132, at 25, col. 2.
tion.l3 8 Only the pattern of DNA in its entirety is unique.139 DNA
researchers "agree that it is possible that there could be two or more
people with the same few lines of the same length in the same
places."'140 Thus, the reliability of DNA profiling depends on the re-
searcher's ability to examine multiple segments and accurately calcu-
late the probability that a match at any given locus is a random
product of chance.141 Currently, there are no uniform standards for
determining the likelihood of a coincidental match.142 A greater con-
cern, however, centers around the sufficiency of population data ba-
ses, in terms of both size and racial diversity.
In order to achieve an accurate distribution of alleles representa-
tive of the population at large, the data base must be composed of a
sizable, freely-mixing community.143 Studies based on small homoge-
nous populations will produce misleading results that do not neces-
sarily hold true for the overall population.'" Presently, however,
there is no concensus among scientists as to the minimum size data
bank necessary to ensure reliable results.145 Surprisingly, one set of
statistics which has been repeatedly cited in support of DNA profil-
ing reliability was derived from a study of only twenty people. 146
Although studies done by Lifecodes have drawn upon a much larger
data base, critics still voice doubts as to the sufficiency of the sample
population.147
Similar concerns arise in relation to the racial and ethnic composi-
tions of the data bases used by the commercial laboratories. Recog-
nizing that each racial group will contain more of certain alleles than
the overall population, the commercial laboratories divide the data
base populations by race. 148 Nonetheless, critics claim that this safe-
guard is inadequate by itself because it operates under the mistaken
assumption that ethnic and racial groups mate purely at random
within the confines of their racial or ethnic classification.149 The sys-
tem thus fails to account for subpopulations within each group which
138. Note, supra note 17, at 488.
139. Id.
140. Sherman, supra note 132, at 25, cols. 2-3 (stressing that researchers are cur-
rently unsure as to how often various band patterns occur within a certain population).
141. Note, supra note 17, at 488.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 489.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Burk, supra note 2, at 465-66. This study is often cited for the proposition that
the chance of a coincidental match between two individuals is one in thirty billion.
147. Id. at 466. Lifecodes has published two studies which were based on popula-
tions of seven hundred and nine hundred people each. Note, DNA Typing: A Rush to
Judgment, 24 GA. L. REv. 669, 678 n.44 (1990).
148. Note, supra note 17, at 489.
149. Id. at 489-90.
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tend to be heavily inbred, thus possessing more alleles in common
than the population at large.150
With regard to the second Williams factor, the DNA profiling in-
dustry is sorely lacking in the area of standardization and regulation.
Beyond the deficiencies in matching standards, there are no uniform
regulations to govern the procedures employed by the commercial
laboratories.151 While the commercial laboratories have established
procedural standards of their own, these self-imposed standards do
little to ensure the reliability of the industry as a whole.
The third factor proposed by the Williams court entails an evalua-
tion of the care with which the procedure is performed, and its po-
tential for abuse. Of course, the inquiry into the carefulness of the
technicians will have to be undertaken on a individualized basis.
However, such inquiries may be meaningless without standardized
procedures against which a particular laboratory's performance can
be compared. Moreover, the potential for abuse of DNA profiling is
great. For example, psychological researchers have shown that, in
the matching stage, the crucial decision as to the degree of similarity
necessary for a "match" may be affected by the priorities of the labo-
ratory scientist.152 In other words, police criminologists, whose goal
is to assist the state in prosecution, may select a much lower match-
ing threshold than would a commercial laboratory which, because of
its commercial interest in stressing the uniqueness of the DNA pat-
tern, may set an unusually high standard for matching.153
The fourth Williams factor, whether there exists an analogous re-
lationship to other routinely admitted scientific evidence, does little
to establish DNA as a reliable scientific technique. In fact, it is very
difficult to find a similar technique with which any analogy to DNA
would be appropriate. Some analogies possibly could be drawn be-
tween DNA and gel electrophoresis.154 However, such comparisons
150. Sherman, supra note 132, at 25, col. 3. For example, DNA probability calcula-
tions assume that "Mexican-American Hispanics are just as likely to have children
with Cuban-American Hispanics as they are with each other and that Caucasian
Catholics, Protestants, and Jews mate randomly." Id.
151. Dr. Eric Lander notes that DNA testing facilities are "virtually unregulated-
with the paradoxical result that clinical laboratories must meet a higher standard to be
allowed to diagnose strep throat than forensic labs must meet to put a defendant on
death row." Sherman, supra note 132, at 24, col. 3 (citations omitted).
152. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 88 (citing Bruner, On Perceptual Readi-
ness, 64 PSYCH. REv. 123 (1957)).
153. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 88-89.
154. For a general discussion of this gel electrophoresis, see Jonakait, supra note
68, at 833.
would not necessarily aid in the admissibility of DNA profiling tech-
nology because gel electrophoresis has a tortured history of its own,
having been declared inadmissible in both California' 55  and
Michigan.l56
The final Williams factor, whether "fail-safe" characteristics exist,
is likewise unfulfilled by current DNA profiling techniques. While
the genetic profiles of the parents serve as an inherent control mech-
anism in paternity testing, no such built-in safety net exists in the
arena of forensic DNA testing.157 "Forensic samples are of unknown
origin and thus have countless numbers of possible alleles. There-
fore, all of the controls for the forensic test must be imposed from
the outsid"158
2. Danger of Unfair Prejudice
If, after considering the reliability factors proposed by Williams, a
court finds DNA profiling to be probative, it would then have to con-
sider the dangers that would accompany the admission of DNA pro-
filing in a jury trial.
As with any other novel scientific evidence, the greatest danger as-
sociated with DNA profiling evidence is its potential to mislead the
jury. 5 9 The possibility that the jury will be dazzled by the scientific
glitter of DNA profiling technology is certainly great. As one appel-
late court noted, the scientific evidence which accompanies DNA,
"unlike that presented with fingerprint, footprint or bite mark evi-
dence, is highly technical, incapable of observation, and requires the
jury to either accept or reject the scientist's conclusion that it can be
done."i 6 0 Thus, a jury faced with DNA's highly technical process and
accompanying statistical interpretations will likely accept the testi-
mony of the expert witnesses without question. 161 Critics caution
that DNA casts a looming shadow over other more traditional meth-
ods of proof such as alibis and eyewitness testimony when presented
to a jury of laypersons.i6 2
Moreover, the necessity of presenting statistical evidence to the
155. People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 709 P.2d 440, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1985).
156. People v. Young, 425 Mich. 470, 391 N.W.2d 270 (1986).
157. Note, supra note 17, at 511.
158. Id.
159. See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (novel evidence
may "assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen").
160. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
161. This appears to be the case already, as indicated by glowing magazine and
newspaper reports which praise DNA as a catalyst of quick jury verdicts: "It took the
jury twelve minutes to find Jones guilty." Williams, supra note 4, at 26.
162. Gest, Convicted By Their Own Genes, 105 U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Oct. 31,
1988, at 70 (stating that juries are unable to treat DNA profiles as "just one piece of
evidence to be considered").
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jury along with DNA evidence also raises the danger of unfair preju-
dice. Studies have shown that jurors often misinterpret statistical in-
formation.16 3 Recognizing this problem, many courts have excluded
statistical evidence as more prejudicial than probative. 164 Banning
statistical evidence in the case of DNA, however, would pose a far
greater danger. Jurors might then assume that a DNA match conclu-
sively links the defendant to the evidence. Therefore, until DNA
testing advances to a higher degree of precision, its utility as an evi-
dentiary tool in jury trials is questionable.
Finally, "an exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of a par-
ticular technique [could make] its use prejudicial or likely to mislead
the jury."165 Once again, DNA falls easily into this trap, as media re-
ports unabashedly proclaim that "DNA can rule out everyone else in
the world as a possible perpetrator of a crime."'16
In applying the Federal Rules balancing test, DNA has little proba-
tive value due to its unproven reliability. Furthermore, given the
complexity of the technique and its tendency to mislead the jury, the
probative value of DNA evidence is substantially outweighed by the
dangers of unfair prejudice.
Thus, when examined closely, DNA profiling evidence fails to meet
the admissibility standards under either Frye or the Federal Rules
test. However, in struggling with this admissibility puzzle, the courts
have employed innovative interpretations of both standards, often re-
sulting in the admissibility of DNA profiling evidence.
V. JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF DNA PROFILING EVIDENCE
To date, only four criminal cases involving the admissibility of
163. For example, one study indicated that jurors mistakenly reasoned that if a de-
fendant's blood type is found in only ten percent of the population, there is a ninety
percent chance that he is guilty. Thompson & Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical
Evidence in Criminal Trials, 11 HUMAN BEHAV. 167, 170 (1987).
164. See State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. 1978) (statistical probability evi-
dence improperly received, but not prejudicial); People v. Macedonio, 42 N.Y.2d 944,
366 N.E.2d 1355, 397 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1977) (admission of blood-type evidence held re-
versible error); see also People v. McMillen, 126 Mich. App. 211, 336 N.W.2d 895 (1983)
(admission of blood-type evidence held harmless error); People v. Robinson, 27 N.Y.2d
864, 265 N.E.2d 543, 317 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1970) (admission of blood-type evidence held
harmless error).
165. United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1019
(1975).
166. Marx, DNA Fingerprinting Takes the Witness Stand, 240 SCIENCE 1616 (1988).
See also Moss, supra note 3, at 69-70 ("disputing the technology is like disputing the
law of gravity").
DNA profiling evidence have climbed to the state appellate level.167
Of these four, two were decided in Frye jurisdictions. The other two,
decided in Florida and Virginia, rested on the more liberal founda-
tion of the Federal Rules test.
A. Admissibility of DNA Profiling Evidence under the Federal
Rules Test
1. Andrews v. State
Reaching the appellate level in 1988, the Andrews 168 case was one
of the first criminal cases to utilize the controversial DNA evidence.
Tommie Lee Andrews was charged with aggravated battery, bur-
glary, and sexual battery.169 The victim never saw her assailant, who
"jumped on top of her, and covered her face with a sleeping bag."170
Police arrested Andrews, who was subsequently convicted by a trial
court which, over protests by the defense, admitted into evidence
findings of a DNA profile that linked Andrews to the rape.171
The defendant appealed the trial court decision. However, the de-
fense did not mount a serious attack on the admissibility of DNA,
choosing instead to focus its challenge on the methods used by the
commercial laboratory that conducted the test.172 The court of ap-
peals, however, deemed a review of both questions necessary. There-
fore, the court examined the admissibility of DNA evidence,173
although it received little assistance from defense counsel who failed
to call a single expert witness.174
Following a lengthy discussion of the two standards of admissibility
for scientific evidence, the court decided to employ the Federal Rules
test. 75 After pronouncing DNA evidence "helpful to the jury,"'176
the court commenced its inquiry into the probative value of the DNA
profiling evidence. Here, the court utilized the indicia of reliability
set forth in a federal third circuit opinion, United States v. Down-
167. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Spencer v. Com-
monwealth, 238 Va. 563, 385 S.E.2d 850 (1989); Cobey v. Maryland, 80 Md. App. 31, 559
A.2d 391 (1989); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989).
168. 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
169. Id. at 842.
170. Moss, supra note 3, at 66. The fact that the victim was prevented from seeing
her attacker's face made the admissibility of DNA evidence a crucial aspect of the
state's case. Id.
171. 533 So. 2d at 843.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Sherman, supra note 132, at 24.
175. Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 843-47. However, in a brief footnote, the court asserted
that DNA evidence would satisfy the requirement of the Frye test, were it to be em-
ployed. Id. at 847 n.6.
176. Id. at 849.
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ing.177 These factors, while not identical, are similar to those
promulgated by Williams.s7 8
The court first addressed DNA's "relationship to more established
modes of scientific analysis."'17 9 Noting DNA's solid reputation for
reliability in terms of medical research, the court found that such
nonjudicial use is a valid indicator of DNA reliability. 8 0 Nowhere in
its evaluation of DNA's reliability, however, did the court attempt to
delineate possible factors which might make a perfectly acceptable
tool of medical research wholly inappropriate for use in the criminal
courtroom.
Next, the court examined scientific literature pertaining to the re-
liability of DNA. Once again, though, the inquiry was less than thor-
ough. The court relied exclusively on the testimony of a scientist
employed by a commercial laboratory who stated that he "was una-
ware of any [publications] that argue against the test's reliability."''s
Finally, the court heard testimony concerning the rate of error as-
sociated with DNA profiling techniques. The court adopted the view
that "if there was something wrong with the process, it would ordina-
rily lead to no result being obtained rather than an erroneous re-
sult."182 Upon these findings, the court held that DNA testing is
reliable, and therefore, probative. 8 3 '
The court then turned its attention briefly to the possible danger of
unfair prejudice associated with the admission of DNA profiling evi-
dence. While recognizing that DNA profiling involves highly techni-
177. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985) (involving the admissibility of expert testimony as
to the accuracy of an eyewitness account offered by the defendant). These factors in-
clude "the novelty of the new technique, i.e., its relationship to more established
modes of scientific analysis, the existence of ... specialized literature... expert wit-
nesses, and . .. nonjudicial uses." Id. at 238-39 (citing J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 702[03]).
178. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198-99 (2d Cir. 1978). See supra notes
129-30 and accompanying text.
179. Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 849.
180. Id. at 849-50.
181. Id. at 850.
182. Id. at 850-51. Had the defense called expert witnesses of its own, the court's
conclusion might have been much different. For example, geneticist James Geyer
claims that commercial laboratories are in error at least two percent of the time in pa-
ternity cases, which are much more conducive to DNA profiling than are criminal
cases. According to Dr. Geyer, he has sent DNA samples to two different labs, only to
have one lab declare that "the putative father was definitely-with astronomically
high odds-the father," while the second lab maintained "that the father was defi-
nitely-again, with astronomically high odds-not the father." Chicago Tribune, Jan.
29, 1990, at 4, col. 7.
183. Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 849-50.
cal concepts which could overwhelm a jury, the court asserted that
this factor "requires courts to proceed with special caution, [but] it
does not of itself render the evidence unreliable."1 8 4 Furthermore,
the court dismissed without debate the danger associated with al-
lowing the testimony of potentially biased expert witnesses, adding
that "neither Frye nor our evidence code require impartiality."'185
The court of appeals thus affirmed the decision of the trial court,
holding DNA profiling evidence admissible in criminal
proceedings. 8 6
2. Spencer v. Commonwealth
In a bifurcated jury trial held in October of 1989, the Virginia
Supreme Court addressed the DNA admissibility question on appel-
late review.'8 7 Timothy Wilson Spencer had been convicted and sen-
tenced to death in three separate trials stemming from the rapes and
murders of three women.18 8 Two of those convictions, "based on
DNA fingerprinting and precious little other evidence,"' 8 9 were the
subject of earlier appeals.' 9 0
Spencer challenged the admissibility of the DNA test results,
claiming that the state had failed to establish the general acceptance
and reliability of DNA profiling.19 1 In assessing the admissibility of
the DNA evidence, the court declined to follow the Frye test,192
choosing instead to employ a relevance standard.193 In this appeal,
the court held the DNA evidence admissible, without analysis, rely-
ing on its prior admissibility holdings in Spencer I and Spencer I1.-94
184. Id.
185. Id. at 849 n.9.
186. Id. at 850-51.
187. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 563, 385 S.E.2d 850 (1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 1171 (1990) [hereinafter Spencer III].
188. Cooper, supra note 125, at 14.
189. Id.
190. The Virginia Supreme Court issued three separate opinions: Spencer v. Com-
monwealth, 238 Va. 275, 384 S.E.2d 775 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 759 (1990) [here-
inafter Spencer 1]; Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 384 S.E.2d 785 (1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1171 (1990) [hereinafter Spencer II]; Spencer III, supra note 187.
191. 238 Va. at 573, 385 S.E.2d at 855-56. Spencer unsuccessfully advanced this same
argument in Spencer I and Spencer II. Id. at 573, 385 S.E.2d at 856.
192. Spencer urged the court to employ the Frye standard in reaching its verdict on
the admissibility of DNA profiling evidence. Id. at 573 n.5, 385 S.E.2d at 856 n.5. The
court rejected the adoption of the Frye test, relying on its holding in Spencer I. Id.
(citing Spencer 1, 238 Va. at 290 n.10, 384 S.E.2d at 783 n.10). The court noted, however,
that DNA testing would pass the Frye test if it were applied. Id.
193. Id. at 573 n.5, 385 S.E.2d at 856 n.5. This relevancy standard, set forth in
O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 690, 695-96, 364 S.E.2d 491, 504-05 (1988), bears only
a slight resemblance to the Federal Rules test. However, it does necessitate a finding
of reliability, and therefore, it is most appropriately dealt with in this section.
194. Spencer, 238 Va. at 573, 385 S.E.2d at 856 (citing Spencer I, 238 Va. at 290, 384
S.E.2d at 783; Spencer I, 238 Va. at 315, 384 S.E.2d at 797).
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It is necessary, therefore, to review those decisions in order to ascer-
tain the basis for the court's reliability finding.
In both Spencer I and Spencer II, the court's ultimate determina-
tion of the reliability of DNA profiling evidence was based almost ex-
clusively on testimony of state witnesses. As in Andrews, the defense
was unable to locate any expert witnesses of its own to contradict the
state's claims of reliability.195 Worse yet, the defense conceded that
"DNA tests are accepted 'as reliable within the scientific commu-
nity,' " and that "the trial court had little choice but to accept the
DNA printing evidence."196 While these concessions were obviously
damaging to the defendant's position, they should not have foreclosed
the admissibility question.
The Spencer court erroneously equated the lack of defense wit-
nesses with reliability. Moreover, the court failed to consider factors
of unfair prejudice, including the inherent bias of some the state's
witnesses197 and the use of statistical evidence.198 Thus, the court
dispensed with the Federal Rules requirement of balancing probative
value against unfair prejudice.
In sum, both the Andrews and Spencer courts misapplied the Fed-
eral Rules test in determining the admissibility' of DNA profiling evi-
dence. Unfortunately, the courts have not fared significantly better
in their application of the Frye standard to the DNA controversy.
B. Admissibility of DNA Profiling Evidence Under Frye
1. Cobey v. Maryland
Following closely on the heels of Andrews, the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals took up the issue of DNA admissibility in the case of
Cobey v. Maryland.199 The defendant, Kenneth S. Cobey, was
195. 238 Va. 275, 289, 384 S.E.2d 775, 782-83 (1989); 238 Va. 295, 314-15, 384 S.E. 2d
785, 796-97 (1989).
196. 238 Va. 275, 289-90, 384 S.E.2d 775, 782-83 (1989) (citations omitted). The de-
fense did maintain, nonetheless, that the court "should hold off until another day any
decision that DNA printing is acceptable evidence in the courts of Virginia." Id. at 290,
384 S.E.2d at 783.
197. Dr. Michael Baird who testified for the state in Spencer I, and Dr. McElfresh
who testified for the state in Spencer H and Spencer III, were both employed by the
commercial laboratory (Lifecodes) which performed the DNA testing. Spencer 1, 238
Va. at 289, 384 S.E.2d at 782; Spencer II, 238 Va. at 313, 384 S.E.2d at 796-97; Spencer III,
238 Va. at 573-74, 384 S.E.2d at 856-57.
198. Spencer 1, 238 Va. at 289, 384 S.E.2d at 782; Spencer II, 238 Va. at 314, 384
S.E.2d at 797.
199. 80 Md. App. 31, 559 A.2d 391 (1989).
charged with raping a young woman in September of 1985.200 Cobey
was stopped by police while driving the victim's car from the scene.
A subsequent investigation revealed facts which led to his arrest on
charges stemming from the sexual assault.20 1
Over Cobey's objection, the trial court admitted into evidence the
results of a DNA test which declared a match between the defend-
ant's blood sample and a semen stain on the victim's clothes.20 2 As
was the case in Andrews, defense attorneys challenged only the
methodology utilized in the DNA test. However, the court declared
that "the novelty of the question requires that we address both the
frontal assault on Cellmark's methodology as well as the admission
into evidence generally of DNA fingerprints." 20 3
Under the guidance of Frye, the court proceeded to analyze the ad-
missibility of DNA. The court reviewed the trial court testimony of
five expert witnesses for the state who testified that DNA is gener-
ally accepted within the scientific community. 20 4 However, the court
failed to elaborate on any of this testimony, and focused instead on
the lack of contradictory evidence. 205 This left the impression that
defense counsel's failure to locate expert witnesses of its own may
have allowed the state to prevail by default.
In addition to the defendant's failure to present expert testimony,
the court was influenced by the acceptance of DNA evidence in other
jurisdictions.206 Unfortunately, this reliance on judicial precedent is
a dubious basis by which to gauge general acceptance under the Frye
test. In fact, "this use of prior judicial decisions undercuts the ration-
ale supporting Frye-that those most qualified to judge the validity
of a technique should have the determinative voice." 20 7
The Frye test depends on general acceptance by the scientific com-
munity, not the judiciary. Moreover, by looking to Andrews for sup-
port, the court did not achieve even a second-hand finding of general
acceptance, because the Andrews court applied the more liberal Fed-
eral Rules test, which obviates the need to prove general acceptance.
Adding further to the opinion's appearance of superficiality, the
200. Id. at 33, 559 A.2d at 391-92.
201. Id. at 34, 559 A.2d at 392. The defendant was tried twice on the sexual offenses
and related charges. The first judgment was reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Id. at 33 n.2, 559 A.2d at 391 n.2. See also Cobey v. State, 73 Md. App. 233, 533 A.2d 944
(1987). This appeal is the result of the second trial. Id.
202. 80 Md. App. at 34, 559 A.2d at 392.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 35, 559 A.2d at 392, 398.
206. Cobey, 80 Md. App. at 35, 559 A.2d at 392 (citing Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d
841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); People v. Wesley, 140 Misc. 2d 306, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643
(N.Y. Co. Ct. 1988)).
207. Giannelli, supra note 74, at 1218-19 (emphasis in original).
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court neglected any mention of the proper field from which the trial
court gleaned a finding of general acceptance. Nonetheless, after a
general discussion of the DNA profiling procedure, the court ruled
that the trial court did not err in admitting the DNA evidence.20 8
2. State v. Schwartz
On November 3, 1989, the Minnesota Supreme Court broke new
legal ground by becoming the first state appellate court in the nation
to exclude DNA profiling evidence in a criminal trial. The watershed
case, State v. Schwartz,209 arose from the brutal stabbing of a young
woman in May of 1988.210 Armed with a valid search warrant, law
enforcement officials retrieved a blood-stained pair of jeans from the
defendant's home.211 A similarly soiled shirt, allegedly belonging to
the defendant, was found near the crime scene. 212 DNA profiling
analysis was performed on these items, resulting in a match between
the victim's blood and the blood-stained clothing.2 13 These findings
were introduced in the trial court on the state's motion, over the ob-
jection of defendant Schwartz. However, simultaneously with grant-
ing the state's motion to admit DNA evidence, the court certified
three admissibility questions to the Minnesota Court of Appeals,
which immediately certified these same questions to the Minnesota
Supreme Court.214
After determining that the admissibility issue would be governed
by the Frye standard,215 the supreme court turned to the question of
general acceptance of DNA profiling. As a first step toward this goal,
the court noted DNA's general acceptance among medical research-
ers.216 While this information is noteworthy, it is of little use in as-
sessing the admissibility of DNA unless medical research is the
relevant field from which general acceptance is to be drawn. As this
Comment has previously discussed,2 17 such a choice would be unwise.
Nowhere in its opinion, however, did the court reveal its selection of
208. Cobey, 80 Md. App. at 43, 559 A.2d at 398.
209. 447 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1989).
210. Id. at 423.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 423-24.
214. Id. at 424-25.
215. Although the court briefly entertained a discussion on the merits of the Fed-
eral Rules approach, it concluded that the Frye standard "facilitates more objective
and uniform rulings." Id. at 424.
216. Id at 425.
217. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
a relevant field for purposes of evaluating general acceptance under
Frye.
Still searching for general acceptance, the court recited a string of
decisions from other jurisdictions which have admitted DNA evi-
dence.218 However, unless the judiciary is the relevant field, this in-
quiry is a futile exercise as well. Nevertheless, on these bases, the
court held that DNA profiling analysis is generally accepted.219
Despite its finding of general acceptance, the Minnesota Supreme
Court refused to admit the proffered DNA evidence.220 After re-
viewing the trial court testimony of twelve expert witnesses, the
court determined that the commercial laboratory's methodology was
unreliable, prone to false positives, and deficient in control proce-
dures. 22 1 Thus, the court held that DNA test results are admissible
only if derived in laboratories that comply with appropriate stan-
dards and controls, and whose testing data and results are available
to defense counsel. 222
3. People v. Castro
While the case of People v. Castro223 is not an appellate court deci-
sion, it nonetheless merits discussion since the Castro hearing has
been referred to as "the most comprehensive and extensive legal ex-
amination of DNA forensic identification tests held to date in the
United States." 224 In fact, the Frye hearing in Castro, which con-
cluded in August of 1989, constituted the first denial of admittance of
DNA evidence by a trial court.
The defendant, Joseph Castro, was charged with the stabbing
deaths of a young mother, seven months pregnant, and her two-year-
old daughter.225 During the arrest, an observant police officer no-
ticed a speck of blood on Castro's wristwatch.226 Although Castro
claimed that the blood was his own, DNA profiling tests performed
on the sample concluded that the blood in fact belonged to the adult
218. 447 N.W.2d at 425-26 (citing Cobey v. State, 80 Md. App. 31, 559 A.2d 391 (Md.
Ct. Spec. 1989); People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1989); People v. Wesley, 140 Misc. 2d 306, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1988); An-
drews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
219. 447 N.W.2d at 426.
220. Id. at 428. The court stated that: "While we agree with the trial court that fo-
rensic DNA typing has gained general acceptance in the scientific community, we hold
that admissibility of specific test results in a particular case hinges on the laboratory's
compliance with appropriate standards and controls, and the availability of their test-
ing data and results." Id.
221. 447 N.W.2d at 426-28.
222. Id. at 428.
223. 144 Misc. 2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
224. Id. at 956-57, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
225. Id. at 957, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
226. Id.
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victim. 2 27 The admissibility of these test results was the subject of
the pretrial hearing and the court's decision.
The Castro hearing, which lasted over three months and produced
five thousand pages of recorded testimony,22 8 was the first proceed-
ing in which the defense mounted a serious attack on the admissibil-
ity of DNA. In contrast to previous cases in which the testimony of
the states' expert witnesses went unchallenged,229 the Castro defense
called five expert witnesses of its own.23o
In analyzing the admissibility of DNA, the court formulated its
own interpretation of the Frye standard, breaking it down into two
basic inquiries: 1) "Is there a theory, which is generally accepted in
the scientific community, which supports the conclusion that DNA
forensic testing can produce reliable results?" and, 2) "[A]re there
techniques or experiments that currently exist that are capable of
producing reliable results in DNA identification and which are gener-
ally accepted in the scientific community?"2 3 ' Beyond the require-
ments of Frye, the court ruled that a pretrial hearing should be held
in all cases involving DNA evidence to determine the answer to the
following question: "Did the testing laboratory perform the accepted
scientific techniques in analyzing the forensic samples in this particu-
lar case?" 232
In evaluating the court's formulation of Frye, several deficiencies
are immediately apparent. The court disregarded the need for gen-
eral acceptance of the technique when put to forensic application.23 3
227. Id. at 957, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 985-86.
228. Id. at 957, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 986.
229. See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Spencer v.
Commonwealth, 238 Va. 563, 385 S.E.2d 850 (1989); Cobey v. Maryland, 80 Md. App. 31,
559 A.2d 391 (1989). See also supra notes 174, 185, 195, 206 and accompanying text.
230. 144 Misc. 2d at 958, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 986. Testifying for the defense were: Dr.
Conrad Gilliam, an expert in genetics and molecular genetics; Dr. Lorraine Flaherty,
an expert in molecular genetics and quality control; Dr. Eric Lander, an expert in ge-
netics and population genetics; Dr. Phillip Green, an expert in genetics and population
genetics; and Dr. Howard Cooke, an expert on genetic probes. Id.
231. Id. at 959, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
232. The court summarily dismissed the issue of the forensic reliability of DNA
profiling. Quoting from a University of Virginia Law Review, the court stated that:
"There is nothing controversial about the theory underlying DNA typing. Indeed, this
theory is so well accepted that its accuracy is unlikely even to be raised as an issue in
hearings on the admissibility of the new tests." Id. at 961, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 989 (quoting
Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 60-61).
233. Id. at 959-60, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 987-88. The court noted that "[a] scientist may
have no trouble accepting the general proposition that DNA typing can be done relia-
bly, yet still have doubts about the reliability of the test being performed by a particu-
lar laboratory." Id. at 973, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 995 (quoting Thompson & Ford, DNA
Moreover, the court engaged in an act of legal wizardry when it
found that the second prong of the Frye inquiry was satisfied. By the
Castro court's own definition, novel scientific evidence must be sup-
ported by techniques that currently exist and are capable of produc-
ing reliable results.234 While noting that two experts testified that
DNA profiling would be able to produce reliable results in "approxi-
mately six months,"235 the court nonetheless held that DNA profil-
ing met the Frye requirements. 236 In an attempt to reconcile this
seemingly fatal contradiction, the court stated that "to breathe any
meaning into the opinion of these highly respected and rather bril-
liant scientists one must conclude that the test is presently reliable
and will remain so for the next six months."237
In its final determination, however, the court found that despite
DNA's general acceptance in the scientific community, the laboratory
had failed to apply proper techniques in this instance. Accordingly,
the court foreclosed the possibility of admitting the DNA evidence in
Castro's case. 238
After reviewing these ground-breaking cases, it is apparent that a
trend toward admissibility of DNA is forming. However, a common
scheme of legal analysis on which to base such decisions has not yet
been established. Until such a consensus is reached, the doubts sur-
rounding the admissibility of DNA will remain. Beyond these ques-
tions of admissibility, however, looms an equally large but often
overlooked issue: the constitutionality of DNA profiling as an instru-
ment of criminal justice.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to challenging the reliability of DNA evidence, criminal
defendants are also likely to challenge; the constitutionality of the
DNA identification process. Presently, at least three bases exist upon
which an unconstitutionality claim could be premised.
The first constitutional concern associated with the forensic use of
DNA profiling is one of "fundamental fairness." 239 In examining the
economics of DNA profiling in the courtroom, it is clear that prosecu-
tors have a distinct advantage over defendants. This is because the
Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV.
45, 57-58 (1989)).
234. 144 Misc. 2d at 958, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
235. Id. at 972, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
236. Id. at 973, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
237. Id. at 972-73, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 995.
238. Id. at 977, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 997-98. Rather than i-elying on objective* matching
standards, the Lifecodes laboratory had "eyeballed" the match. Williams, supra note
4, at 29.
239. Williams, supra note 4, at 31.
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FBI laboratory offers its DNA profiling skills to law enforcement
agencies free of charge.240 Defense attorneys, on the other hand, will
likely utilize commercial laboratories. For many defendants, the cost
of DNA profiling by commercial firms will be prohibitively high.241
Moreover, a sizable number of criminal defendants are indigent. The
Supreme Court has held that the state must provide indigent defend-
ants with the instruments necessary to prepare an adequate de-
fense.2 42 Thus, if DNA profiling technology becomes a commonplace
evidentiary technique, the doctrine of equality may require that the
state provide funding to such defendants, giving them access to both
DNA testing and expert witnesses.243 It is questionable whether the
judiciary budget can bear such a burden at the present time.244
The second area of concern stems from the dangerous combination
of a national obsession with fighting crime together with the aura of
infallibility which has surrounded the DNA profiling technique since
its media debut.245 Because of DNA's unequaled potential to identify
criminal suspects, critics of DNA profiling fear that frustrated law
enforcement officials, lacking sufficient evidence to make arrests,
may be tempted to obtain genetic samples from suspects in violation
of their constitutional rights.246
The United States Supreme Court has stated that police officers
may obtain blood samples for the purpose of determining intoxication
without the consent of the subject. 247 However, in most situations,
such extractions cannot be performed absent a warrant obtained pur-
suant to a finding of probable cause. 248  Even without a warrant,
though, extraction of blood will not constitute an illegal search and
240. Id. See also supra note 26.
241. See Sherman, supra note 132, at 25. Cellmark charges $490 for each DNA test,
and $1000 per day for expert testimony. Lifecodes is only marginally less expensive,
charging $325 per test and $750 for expert witnesses. Id.
242. Burk, supra note 2, at 470 (citing Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1972);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)).
243. The Supreme Court has already held that states may have to pay for an indi-
gent defendant's psychiatric evaluation and corresponding expert testimony. Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
244. For instance, one public defender's office recently spent over $50,000 in prepa-
ration for a trial involving DNA evidence. The defense attorney now "concedes that it
is unlikely that the . .. [p]ublic [d]efender's office is going to spend $50,000 defending
the next person prosecuted with DNA." 'Williams, supra note 4, at 32.
245. See supra notes 3, 4 and accompanying text.
246. For a general discussion of this constitutional issue, see Burk, supra note 2, at
470-71.
247. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-72 (1966).
248. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967).
seizure if the situation presents both "exigent circumstances" and
probable cause for the invasion of the suspect's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.249
Thus, blood samples may always be taken provided there is prob-
able cause to believe that a suspect is intoxicated. The rapid decrease
in the suspect's blood-alcohol ratio over time provides the element of
exigency. No such exigent circumstances exist, however, in relation
to DNA sampling. In contrast to the variability of blood-alcohol
levels, each person's genetic code remains static over his entire life-
time.250 Thus, there is no danger that crucial evidence will be de-
stroyed while the wheels of justice slowly churn out a search
warrant.
While it may appear, therefore, that the individual is protected
against bodily invasions designed to yield DNA samples by the safe-
guard of "detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate," 251 this protec-
tion is far from being a legal certainty. In 1968, the United States
Supreme Court, in Terry v. Ohio,252 sanctioned a limited search on
less than probable cause where necessary to confirm or dispel an of-
ficer's suspicion that a suspect is concealing a weapon.253 These
searches are commonly referred to as "Terry frisks," attesting to the
intended brevity of the search contemplated by the Terry Court.
Thus, the facts of Terry necessitated a ruling only on the permissi-
bility of investigatory detention on less than probable cause. The
Supreme Court has yet to issue a ruling on the constitutionality of
brief, in-field detention of suspects for identification purposes. How-
ever, in Hayes v. Florida,254 the Court went as far as to say that, "a
brief detention in the field for the purpose of fingerprinting, where
there is only reasonable suspicion not amounting to probable cause, is
[not] necessarily impermissible under the Fourth Amendment."2 5
The Court did, however, stop short of holding that compulsory identi-
fication procedures could occur under circumstances lacking probable
cause.
2 5 6
The Supreme Court, therefore, has entertained the idea of enlarg-
ing one of the "few specifically established and well-delineated ex-
ceptions" to the traditional requirements of the fourth amendment in
249. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71.
250. Absent mutation, a person's DNA will remain exactly the same throughout his
life, and even after his death. Thompson & Ford, supra note 29, at 62. Chemotherapy
also might alter DNA to a slight degree. Burk, supra note 2, at 470 n.68.
251. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 356.
252. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
253. Id. at 30-31.
254. 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
255. Id. at 816.
256. See id. at 816-18.
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the case of fingerprinting. 257 However, even if the Court ultimately
rules that in-field detention without probable cause for the purpose
of fingerprinting is constitutional, the extension of that premise to in-
clude genetic sampling would be a clear violation of the spirit of
Terry v. Ohio.258 Two basic tenets support this premise.
First, the Supreme Court has expressly stated that Terry frisks are
constitutional within the fourth amendment only if the procedures
employed are "the least intrusive means reasonably available to ver-
ify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time."2 59 DNA
profiling is most often performed using samples of fresh blood.
Given the fact that this method of identification requires probing be-
neath the surface of the suspect's skin, DNA profiling techniques are
obviously more intrusive than traditional fingerprinting methods.2 60
Furthermore, the Court has held that the "reasonableness" of a
particular search or seizure shall be determined by balancing an
agency's need for the evidence against the magnitude of the invasion
of a suspect's personal privacy.261 Traditionally, the ruler against
which the level of intrusion was measured was the degree to which
the body was physically invaded. However, this standard may be out-
dated and inappropriate in its application to DNA profiling, which in-
volves not only a physical invasion, but a psychological invasion as
well. This psychological invasion is due to DNA's unmatched ability
to expose personal and private details wholly unrelated to physical
identification of the suspect.2 62
Given this extreme level of intrusiveness, it is evident that DNA
profiling easily surpasses both the degree of invasion associated with
fingerprinting and the needs of the police to conduct an in-field iden-
tification procedure without a warrant. Thus, these factors strongly
indicate that DNA profiling should not be considered in the same cat-
egory as less intrusive identification techniques, should the Court
choose to expand the scope of Terry. In fact, because of DNA's abil-
ity to reveal personal information, the fourth amendment's protec-
tions against unreasonable searches and seizures should apply to a
greater, rather than lesser, degree in the case of DNA profiling.263
257. Note, supra note 17, at 528 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
258. Id. at 529.
259. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
260. Note, supra note 17, at 529-30.
261. Id. at 528 (citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727-28 (1969)).
262. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see infra notes 266-81 and accompanying
text.
263. Note, supra note 17, at 527.
Finally, even if the Court determines that DNA evidence was prop-
erly obtained under the fourth amendment, one further constitu-
tional issue remains, the consequences of which are likely to
reverberate beyond courtroom walls and throughout the population
at large. Currently, the groundwork is being laid for a nationwide
computer network which will store the genetic profiles of certain
criminal offenders who have been convicted of sexual or violent
offenses.264
Civil libertarians are concerned that such a data bank system is ex-
tremely prone to abuse.26s Specifically, it is feared that the profiles
contained within DNA data banks could be used to discriminate
against individuals, depriving them of rights and privileges such as
health benefits and employment opportunities.
Genetic discrimination is, indeed, a very real threat. DNA is a
powerful tool for investigative intelligence. DNA is able to reveal,
with chilling accuracy, facts about a person's past, present, and fu-
ture, which he himself might not know. 266 For instance, DNA can
mark an individual as a carrier of AIDS, prove that he is adopted or
of unknown parentage, and confirm that he is predisposed to develop
certain genetic illnesses.26 7 "As scientists decipher the molecular
misprints that determine our medical fate, these most intimate of de-
tails may be sought after by outsiders with a financial stake in know-
ing them."268
Should the information contained in DNA data banks be made
available to, or inadvertently fall into the hands of, either insurance
companies or employers, the results could be devastating on both an
individual and a community.level. For example, employers could use
DNA data in order to screen out job applicants who might be suscep-
tible to various occupational hazards, in order to reduce corporate
group-health premiums.26 9
Another group who might be interested in accessing information
contained within DNA data banks is insurance companies. The in-
surance industry survives by classifying people by risk, charging
264. Sherman, supra note 132, at 25. State legislatures in California, Colorado, Ne-
vada, and Virginia have all instituted procedures for collecting blood samples from se-
lected prisoners for use in developing DNA data banks. Id.
265. Id.
266. As noted previously, the reliability of DNA profiling as an instrument of ge-
netic research is not disputed. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
267. Address of John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, at the Cali-
fornia Criminalistics Institute Seminar on DNA Identification, Los Angeles, California,
at 3 (Jan. 7, 1988) [hereinafter Van de Kamp].
268. Green, Discrimination by DNA; Possible Consequences of Genetic Testing, 22
HEALTH 86, 86 (1990).
269. Id. Because group-health premiums are based on the group's actual health
care costs, "it's in an employer's economic interest to avoid hiring heavy healthcare
[sic] users." Id.
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greater premiums to those in high-risk categories. In addition, insur-
ance companies engage in the routine practice of refusing to cover
"pre-existing conditions." Thus, an individual whose DNA profiling
information is revealed to insurance companies may be precluded
from coverage of genetic illnesses which he has a potential to de-
velop, or worse yet, be denied health coverage altogether. 270
This type of discrimination is not the product of civil libertarians'
fertile imaginations. In fact, the potential for misusing genetic infor-
mation was dramatically revealed in the early 1970s in connection
with sickle-cell anemia, a genetic blood disorder to which blacks are
especially prone. In a well-intentioned, but ultimately misguided at-
tempt to detect carriers of the disease, several states271 drafted legis-
lation designed to screen the black community for the trait.272 Lack
of confidentiality provisions in these bills led to abuses of the'infor-
mation obtained, and ultimately to discrimination against persons
whose names were contained within the screening files.273 Beyond
the obvious potential for abuse by employers and the insurance in-
dustry, DNA data banks also lend themselves to abuse by the crimi-
nal justice system itself. For example, California Attorney General
John Van de Kamp has pointed to a real possibility that such data
banks would create a temptation for frustrated law enforcement
agents to "engage in genetic fishing expeditions." 274 For instance,
Van de Kamp postulated that if researchers' theories are correct in
linking criminal tendencies to chromosomal deficiencies, "there will
surely come a day when a desperate detective tries to run a search
for every person with that deficiency in the vicinity of a series of un-
270. See id. Geneticist Paul Billings claims that this method of establishing risk
could be grossly unfair to such individuals, even though they possess a genetic ten-
dency to develop a particular disease. According to Billings, genes express themselves
in highly variable manners, and although a person may be predisposed to a particular
disease, he may ultimately be affected to only a slight degree. Id. This variability will
most certainly be overlooked by insurers in evaluating applicants for coverage.
271. Twelve states and the District of Columbia enacted sickle-cell anemia screen-
ing legislation between 1970 and 1972. See Comment, Confidentiality of Genetic Infor-
mation, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1283, 1292 n.55 & 1292-93 n.61 (1983). By 1973, the number
of state screening programs had risen to eighteen. Id. at 1292 n.56.
272. For a general discussion and critical evaluation of these screening programs
and their effects, see P. REILLY, GENETIcs, LAW, AND SOCIAL POLICY 154 (1977).
273. Corporations which' gained access to those files used the information gleaned
therefrom to screen out job applicants whom they perceived to be high insurance risks.
Green, supra note 268, at 86. Moreover, persons who carried only the sickle-cell trait,
as opposed to the active disorder itself, were disqualified from airline positions and
military enlistment, and were subjected to unreasonably high health insurance premi-
ums. Id.
274. Van de Kamp, supra note 267, at 4.
solved murders. '" 27
Supporters of the DNA information network do not envision such
an intrusive data bank system. 2 6 The proposed DNA data bank sys-
tem would store only the genetic profiles of certain criminals.277
However, Professor E. Donald Shapiro of New York School of Law
cautions that, as DNA data banks proliferate, information will be
kept not only on violent criminals, but on citizens from other seg-
ments of the population as well.278 Professor Shapiro stresses that
the FBI's fingerprint files, which were originally intended for identi-
fication of criminals alone, now also contain the fingerprints of ordi-
nary, law-abiding citizens.279 Furthermore, commercial laboratories
have already instituted plans for their own private DNA data banks.
Currently, the Lifecodes corporation is promoting its own version of
a DNA storage bank, which has been referred to as a "baby bank."280
The company hopes to entice parents to buy storage space in its data
bank for genetic information which could be used to identify their
children in the event of a kidnapping.28 '
While supporters of the proposed DNA data bank stress that the
system would be strictly safeguarded against unauthorized intrusions,
similarly safeguarded computer files have been violated repeat-
edly.28 2 Furthermore, in this age of interlocking data bases, "[e]fforts
to safeguard data bases will at best be short-lived; history has proved
that where there's a larcenous will, there is also a way."28 3
Thus, in assessing the use of DNA in the legal arena, the courts
must not allow the power of scientific technology to overshadow the
fundamental concepts of personal freedom and individual rights.
They must come to the realization that a technological advancement
which performs flawlessly in the laboratory may nonetheless remain
unsuitable for application in the courtroom.
VII. CONCLUSION
By its very nature, scientific evidence creates both excitement and
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Gest, supra note 162, at 70.
278. DNA Fingerprinting Called Privacy Threat, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 6, 1990,
at B1.
279. "[W]e started off fingerprinting criminals ... [now] a large percentage of the
population have their fingerprints in a data bank at the FBI. And genetic fingerprint-
ing is the next step .... Id.
280. Kohlberg, Experts Debate Banking Babies, UPI, Feb. 3, 1990.
281. Id. Other proposed uses include storage of DNA samples of persons who are
at high risk for disfiguring accidents, such as airline pilots. Id.
282. Bingham, Visions of Tomorrow; Menaces in the Info Age, TIME, Feb. 1989, at
78.
283. Id.
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concern. DNA profiling is no exception. Given its potential as an in-
strument of justice, the courts have understandably strived to avoid
unnecessary caution and undue delay in moving DNA profiling tech-
nology toward admissibility. At the same time, however, the judici-
ary must be cognizant of the technical limitations of the test and the
dangers which lurk in the unknown. Despite the wondrous pos-
sibilities associated with DNA which could revolutionize criminal in-
vestigation, the benefits will not be without cost. While DNA testing
may be fully suited to scientific research, it has not proven itself to
be reliable in forensic situations. Hopefully, the judiciary will re-
think its interpretation of the standards of legal admissibility as ap-
plied to DNA profiling, keeping in mind that their decisions will al-
ter people's lives and legal positions. To do otherwise is to turn the
courtroom into a research laboratory and defendants into guinea pigs.
Until such time as further studies on the reliability of DNA are con-
ducted, the legal community should approach DNA testing with cau-
tious optimism.
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